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THE U.S. POSTURE ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO MEDICATION &
THE CASE FOR CHANGE
Michael Palmedo and Srividhya Ragavan*

The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of including intellectual property
rights within the larger agenda of trade. While the marriage between trade and
intellectual property was always uncomfortable, COVID-19 exposed the
flaws, failures and the inadequacy of the trade agenda to harmonise
intellectual property rights, particularly for patents in pharmaceuticals.
Typically, the United States through its questionable United States Trade
Representative (USTR) process exposed the vulnerabilities of the intellectual
property systems of the rest of the world. COVID-19 exposed the manner in
which the so-called ‘superior’ intellectual property regime of the US left the
country with a weak health-care system. Testing, cost of medical care, lack
of treatment, lack of quick access to doctors are all barriers that generally
place the United States as having one of the worst health care systems
compared to other developed economies. The onset of COVID-19 merely
exacerbated the existing flaws to expose these vulnerabilities.
At a general level, other governments seemed to have been better prepared
and certainly seem to have responded better. For example, in early 2020
Canadian lawmakers passed a bill that would allow the issuance of
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compulsory licenses for medical products.1 A compulsory license would
allow the government to license the manufacturing of any treatment or
medication or medical device that could help contain the spread of or treat
COVID-19 to either a public agency or a generic drug maker. The license will
allow the product to be available at a lesser cost because it will be free of the
shackles of patent monopoly. The right to compulsorily license a patent to
preserve public health was memorialised by the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) agreement on Intellectual Property known as the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),2 and later reiterated vide the
Doha Declaration on Public Health.3
Similarly, Germany has taken actions to ensure that patents are not a barrier
to public health or to its health care policy.4 Meanwhile, developing countries
like Costa Rica have reached out to the World Health Organization (WHO)
to develop an IP pool to create an open licensing system that will create more
access and affordability.5 Other countries have either already taken or are
gearing up to take the same or similar measures to create access to treatments
and enable research or testing to facilitate a vaccine or a cure.6

1

An Act respecting certain measures in response to COVID-19, Bill C-13, 43rd Parliament
§31 (2020).
2
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
3
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).
4
Act on the Protection of the Population in the Event of an Epidemic Situation of National
Importance, Federal Law Gazette, Pt. 1-14, Mar. 27, 2020.
5
WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, World Health Organization (Jun. 1, 2021, 11:30
am), https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool.
6
International community rallies to support open research and science to fight COVID-19,
World Health Organization (Jun. 1, 2021, 11:45 am), https://www.who.int/news/item/29-052020-international-community-rallies-to-support-open-research-and-science-to-fight-covid19.
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Notably, these actions are legal under the relevant international law, that is,
the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.7 Just like the compulsory licensing flexibility
mentioned earlier, the TRIPS Agreement permits a range of negotiated
flexibilities during a public health crisis to prevent intellectual property from
becoming a barrier to public health by way of respecting sovereign rights of
a nation to prioritise public interests (including access to healthcare) over
intellectual property rights. Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement
allows governments to issue compulsory licenses, permitting generic
companies to produce copies of patented products under certain conditions,
usually including the payment of royalties to the patent holder.8 Other forms
of flexibilities include price control of pharmaceuticals and importation of
generic drugs manufactured from other countries. Many of these were used
during the AIDS pandemic successfully by developing countries albeit with
resistance from the United States.9 Currently, while countries are considering
either flexibilities or, alternatively, cooperative R&D solutions, the U.S.
FDA, on March 23, 2020, surprised the world by granting Gilead’s drug
Remdesivir an Orphan Drug status for the treatment of COVID-19, on
grounds this is a rare disease.10 The orphan drug status essentially allows the
maker of a patented drug about 7 additional years of market exclusivity.11 The
objective of the Orphan Drug Act, 1983, under which the status is granted,
was to encourage research on treatments for diseases that impact a small

7

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2.
Id.
9
Reed Beall and Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since
the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, PLOS MEDICINE (Jan., 2012). See also,
YUGANK GOYAL, COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD
22 (Reto M. Hilty et. al., 2015).
10
Designating an Orphan Product: Drugs and Biological Products, USFDA (Jun. 1, 2021,
12 pm), https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseasesconditions/designating-orphan-product-drugs-and-biological-products.
11
Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA Chronicles (June 1, 2021, 12:30 pm),
https://www.fda.gov/media/92548/download.
8
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number of patients – treatments with small markets.12 That big pharma has
misused the orphan drug provision to extend the exclusivity for known and
patent-expired drugs has been reported extensively. When Remdesivir was
granted the orphan drug status, KEI reported that Gilead developed
Remdesivir using at least $79 million in U.S. government funding after the
Ebola crisis to deal with future potential pandemics.13 The backlash that
resulted caused Gilead to announce that it will “waive all benefits associated”
with the designation.14 That the United States is not actively working to
provide access, and instead considers regulatory and patent related
exclusivities

is

appalling.

Gilead’s

lack

of

public

responsibility

notwithstanding, the FDA’s actions seemed completely dissociated with the
ground realities. On March 26, 2020, the US recorded the highest number of
COVID-19 cases. To provide a background, orphan drugs are meant to treat
what is termed as an orphan disease, which are defined as diseases that affect
fewer than 200,000 patients, for which, typically there is minimal incentive
to innovate a new drug given the smaller market size. Getting the orphan drug
status helps a drug that is otherwise available in the market to become
exclusive to treat the identified orphan disease/condition. The exclusivity that
ensues from the orphan classification helps a drug to avoid market
competition by getting the orphan status. Giving Remdesfavir orphan status
to treat COVID-19 is ironic considering that during that month the US was
recording close to 3,000 patients a day. Thus, the orphan drug status to

12

Matthew Herder, What Is the Purpose of the Orphan Drug Act, PLOS MED (Jan., 2017).
Kathryn Ardizzone, Role of the Federal Government in the Development of Remdesivir,
KEI BRIEFING NOTE (2020), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/KEI-BriefingNote-2020_1GS-5734-Remdesivir.pdf.
14
Gilead Sciences Statement on Request to Rescind Remdesivir Orphan Drug Designation,
Gilead – Company Statements (Jun. 1, 2021, 12:45 pm), https://www.gilead.com/news-andpress/company-statements/gilead-sciences-statement-on-request-to-rescind-remdesivirorphan-drug-designation.
13
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Remdesfavir showcases how the FDA completely altered the incentive
structure meant for getting the orphan status.
The FDA’s actions, comports with the global trade posture of the U.S. which
can be faulted for not appreciating the importance of public health for the
globe and for other countries. In the face of a mounting COVID-19 outbreak,
with the possibility of a shortage of medical equipment and supplies, the U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, defended the trade posture with
China which resulted in a shortage of medical supplies such as gloves and
masks.
More importantly, it is true that historically the United States has actively
worked against access to medication around the globe.15 Be it with HIV,
AIDS or SARS, when parts or all of the world has faced outbreaks of
infectious diseases, the U.S. has ignored the multilateral systems and
unilaterally used the powers of the Trade Act to oppose the fair use of
negotiated flexibilities.16
To provide a background, the Trade Act, 1974 under Section 301 unilaterally
authorises the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
identify and pursue countries perceived as denying adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property (IP) rights or fair and equitable market
access to U.S. industries or entities that rely on IP protection.17 Every year,
USTR releases the Special 301 Report accusing various countries of having
inadequate IP policies, and many of the alleged violations focus on

15

Aswathy Asok, Compulsory Licensing For Public Health And USA’s Special 301
Pressure: An Indian Experience, JOURN. OF IPR 24, 125-131 (Sep.-Nov. 2019).
16
JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE AND WAYS
FORWARD 22 (Reto M. Hilty, et. al., 2015).
17
19 U.S.C § 2242; §182 of the Trade Act of 1974.
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pharmaceutical patent protection.18 Once identified, USTR applies direct and
indirect pressure through trade negotiations and preference systems in order
to win policy changes favored by U.S. IP-owning stakeholders in the
identified countries. USTR seeks IP policy changes by amending laws,
providing regulatory exclusivities, or directing the way specific laws are
implemented. These changes typically fall in line with the expectations of the
USTR without fully appreciating local realities, and target the TRIPS-based
flexibilities that provide for access to medications. Laws and amendments
made in other countries to ensure access to medication form a huge part of
the Special 301 Report, such that developing countries typically assert that
USTR works to take away negotiated TRIPS flexibilities to provide access to
medication.

The U.S. Special 301 Report routinely promotes levels of

intellectual property protection that exceed what is required by the TRIPS
Agreement, termed now as TRIP-Plus provisions.
The COVID-19 crisis makes it imperative for all countries to fully use TRIPS
flexibilities. Thus, while internally the U.S. will have to reconsider much of
the currently prevailing health-care systems, not much has been said about
how COVID-19 could affect the role of the USTR on the issue of
pharmaceutical patenting and trade. In order to show the extent to which
USTR has targeted the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the Special 301 Report,
we reviewed countries that have used TRIPS flexibilities in the past to tackle
different health crisis such as AIDS, SARS, Zika, etc. In gist, we specifically
examined reactions of the USTR when a country used TRIPS flexibilities by
considering the subsequent placement of that country on the Special 301 Lists
and the reason for the placement.

18

Special 301, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Jun. 1, 2021, 12:05 pm),
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301.
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To do this, we used the most comprehensive source of data on the use of
TRIPS flexibilities — the TRIPS Flexibilities Database — compiled by
Medicines Law and Policy.19 It contains examples of use of compulsory
licenses, patent exceptions, parallel imports, LDC transition provisions by
countries and outlines the flexibility used in order to access generic
medicines. The database is one of the more comprehensive set of data on use
of flexibilities. The list does not claim to be exhaustive, but it contains many
instances of use of these flexibilities and thus helps to make the correlation
between the use of flexibilities and reaction of the USTR. There are a total of
79 countries in the database. Some countries have used TRIPS flexibilities
more than once, and the database includes each instance of a country’s use of
flexibilities.
In reviewing countries that have used TRIPS flexibilities and subsequent
(re)actions of the USTR through Special 301 listings with a keen eye on the
access to medication question, we found the following:
First, we found that 93% of people living in countries that used flexibilities
are from countries that were placed on a Special 301 List the year after their
government issued a compulsory license.
The countries that are included in the Special 301 Report are often large
markets. China, India, Indonesia and Brazil are on the Special 301 Lists each
year. Based on the most recent World Bank data, 4.5 billion people live in the
non-African countries that used TRIPS flexibilities, and 4.2 billion them live

19

The TRIPS Flexibility Database, Medicines Law & Policy (Jun. 1, 2021, 12:07 pm),
http://tripsflexibilities.medicineslawandpolicy.org/.
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in countries that were listed in the Special 301 Report the year after they first
used or planned to use a TRIPS flexibility – or 93%.20
Second, the world’s total population is 7.5 billion people. Considering the
population of the countries that have been placed on the Special 301 list for
having included TRIPS flexibilities, a whopping 56% of the world’s
population today live in countries that were placed on a Special 301 List the
year after their government used (or planned to use) a TRIPS flexibility.
Thus, directly or indirectly, the USTR’s actions has affected access to
medication for over half of the world’s population outside of the United
States.
Third, 61% of the (non-African) countries that used TRIPS flexibilities were
included on the Special 301 List of the immediately following year.
Importantly, the report generally has not included Sub-Saharan African
countries for reasons related to intellectual property and healthcare. A
Presidential Executive Order, 13155, issued by the U.S. in 2000, which was
a fall-out considering the AIDS crisis and its devastating effect on Africa,
stated that "the United States shall not seek, through negotiation or otherwise,
the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or policy" used by
Sub-Saharan African countries to fight HIV/AIDS. The Executive Order was
a by-product of negotiation by the African Union after AIDS ravaged the
continent in early 2000s.
Notably, out of the 79 countries in the TRIPS Flexibilities Database, 41 are
located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Out of the remaining 38 (non-Sub-Saharan

20

The most recent publicly available World Bank population data is from 2018. The World
Bank databank does not include statistics on Taiwan, so here we use UN data for the same
year, compiled by Worldometer.

84

Indian J. Intell. Prop. L.

African) countries, 23 were included on one of the Special 301 Lists the year
following their use of a TRIPS flexibility. That amounts to 61%. That is, all
of these 38 countries had considered seriously, or, issued or, begun the
process of issuing (a) compulsory license(s) for a medicine. It is notable that
USTR rarely uses the explicit term “compulsory license” when identifying
countries as having inadequate intellectual property protection. USTR will
often pair specific grievances with other, vague complaints about a list
country’s intellectual property landscape. For instance, even in the 2019
Special 301 Report, along with specific complaints about India USTR noted
that IPR protection concerns remained about India due to inadequate laws and
ineffective enforcement – which really could pertain to anything but was
essentially a fall out from the one compulsory license India issued to cover
Bayer’s Nexavar in 2012. But, each of these notations of the USTR have
historically prevented access to medication. Also, with countries like India, a
one-time use of TRIPS flexibility has resulted in Special 301 mention for
several years such that it becomes a deterrent for the country to use that or
another flexibility again.
The table below highlights countries that used TRIPS Flexibilities and
Placement on Special 301 Lists. Importantly, the table highlights how
unilateral PWL status, arguably in violation of the World Trade
Organization’s multilateral dispute settlement process, ensues from the Office
of the USTR, as a consequence of sovereign national action which was in
comport with negotiated TRIPS flexibilities. Importantly, countries like India
have been featured with PWL status, which needed to comply with the State
of Administrative Action submitted to ensure compliance with the
multilateral dispute settlement process as outlined in the opinion in Special

85

301-310 of the Trade Act, 1974.21 Nevertheless, it is important for readers to
know that one violation typically ensues in several years of featuring – most
often, unfairly in the Special 301 report by the USTR such as with India.
Country

First

Year

Placed on

Type

Using TRIPS

a

Flexibility

Executed

Flexibility

301

Special

of

Flexibility

Population

List

the
Following
Year?22
Argentina

2005

Yes

Art 31

No

44,494,502

Belarus

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

9,485,386

Brazil

2001

Yes

Art 31

Yes

209,469,333

Canada

2007

Yes

Art 31 bis

No

37,058,856

Chile

2018

Yes

Art 31

Pending

18,729,160

China

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

1,392,730,000

Colombia

2014

Yes

Art 31

Pending

49,648,685

Ecuador

2003

Yes

Art 31 bis

No

17,084,357

21

United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, World Trade Organization,
WT/DS152/14 (Feb. 28, 2000).
22
Many of these countries were on the Priority Watch List before using the TRIPS flexibility
for various reasons. For example, India was on the PWL for not amending the patent statute
from 2005. In 2005, India amended its patent statute to conform to TRIPS but was again
featured in the Special 301 list as a consequence for using negotiated flexibilities several
times.
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Guatemala

2005

Yes

Art 31

-

17,247,807

India

2008

Yes

Art 31

No

1,352,617,328

Indonesia

2004

Yes

Art 31

Yes

267,663,435

Italy

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

60,431,283

Korea

2002

Yes

Art 31

No

51,635,256

Malaysia

2003

Yes

Art 31

Yes

31,528,585

Pakistan

2006

Yes

Art 31

Yes

212,215,030

Peru

2013

Yes

Art 31

Pending

31,989,256

Philippines

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

106,651,922

Romania

2015

Yes

Art 31

Pending

19,473,936

Russia

2018

Yes

Art 31

Yes

144,478,050

Taipei)

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

23,726,460

Tajikistan

2005

Yes

Art 31

Yes

9,100,837

Thailand

2006

Yes

Art 31

Yes

69,428,524

Ukraine

2004

Yes

Art 31

Yes

44,622,516

Albania

2004

No

Par 7

Yes

2,866,376

Azerbaijan

2011

No

Art 31

Yes

9,942,334

Taiwan
(Chinese
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Cambodia

2005

No

Par 7

Yes

16,249,798

Cuba

2004

No

Art 31

Yes

11,338,138

Georgia

2006

No

Art 31

Yes

3,731,000

Germany

2016

No

Art 31

Yes

82,927,922

Guyana

2005

No

Art 31

Yes

779,004

Haiti

2005

No

Par 7

Yes

11,123,176

Honduras

2005

No

Art 31

Yes

9,587,522

Mongolia

2007

No

Art 31

Yes

3,170,208

Myanmar

2005

No

Art 31

Yes

53,708,395

Nepal

2007

No

Par 7

Yes

28,087,871

Norway

2018

No

Art 31

No

5,314,336

2007

No

Art 31

Yes

8,606,316

2015

No

Art 31

Pending

66,488,991

Papua New
Guinea
United
Kingdom

Within the U.S., COVID has exposed the lacunas of a health care system that
is inaccessible to many Americans. Even when accessible, the bureaucracy of
a system that is completely privatised makes both access and affordability a
rigorous exercise. COVID-19 will necessarily raise questions about the flaws
of the healthcare system in the United States.
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Along the same vein, COVID-19 raises important issues about innovation and
access to health care globally. The world will be forced to consider whether
the IP maximalist rhetoric of trade and innovation that has been used by
USTR and the WTO to undermine public health, is, in turn, creating a worse
barrier to public health. COVID-19 has also increased the significance of
finding an integrated solution that includes the access question into the larger
debate on trade and innovation. It has highlighted that a public health crisis
in one part of the world can affect the globe, global trade, and all that the U.S.
and the WTO stands for in unimaginable ways. COVID-19 has underscored
the need for a balance between innovation and access.
For the U.S., COVID-19 has undermined the carefully constructed rhetoric
that stronger IP – stronger than what is required by WTO – is needed to drive
innovation, and therefore trumps concerns over pricing and access to
healthcare. As the U.S. struggles with the global pandemic, access to
healthcare and affordability of medication seem to be the one paradigm that
can alleviate much of the national and global concerns, including those that
involve trade. Lack of medications either because of lack of research or,
access, can catapult what could be a national public health issue into an
international crisis or a pandemic
While as a nation we consider different long-term solutions, the role of the
USTR via-a-vis the use of public health flexibilities should be up for a serious
debate nationally. Not just within the United States but at the level of the
World Trade Organization too, which turned a blind eye to the unilateral
pressure the U.S. imposes indirectly after agreeing to a system that requires
multilateral dispute resolution. COVID-19 perhaps, is a call to reset the dial
and look at trade with a dose of realism.

